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Abstract 
We study the effects of the property tax base shock caused by natural gas drilling 
in the Barnett Shale in Texas–a state that taxes oil and gas wells as property. Over 
the boom and bust in drilling, housing appreciation closely followed the oil and 
gas property tax base, which expanded the total tax base by 23 percent at its 
height. The expansion led to a decline in property tax rates while maintaining or 
increasing revenues to schools. Overall, each $1 per student increase in the oil and 
gas property tax base increased the value of the typical home by $0.15. Some 
evidence suggests that the cumulative density of wells nearby may lower housing 
values, indicating that drilling could reduce local welfare without policies to 
increase local public revenues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Extraction of natural gas or other natural resources has been argued to improve economic 
outcomes in some regions of the country and not others. Oil abundance, for example, increased 
long-term per capita income in the south-central U.S. (Michaels, 2011), but extractive booms 
elsewhere in the country eventually lowered income (Jacobson & Parker, 2014). What explains 
such diverse experiences? Variation in policy provides a potential explanation, with some 
policies turning periodic natural resource windfalls into benefits enjoyed more broadly into the 
future. An important policy difference across U.S. states is whether oil and gas wells are taxed as 
property and in turn fund schools, roads, and other local public investments that affect long-term 
economic performance and welfare. Some major oil and gas producing states have such taxes 
(Texas, and Colorado); others do not (Louisiana and Pennsylvania) (Raimi & Newell, 2014).  
 We study Texas’ Barnett Shale, which has the longest history of drilling of any shale 
formation in the world, and show how taxing natural gas wells as property shaped the 
relationship between shale development and housing values. There are good reasons to expect 
expansions in the property tax base to benefit local residents and increase housing values. In 
most states important public goods‒roads, parks, and primary and secondary education‒are 
provided locally and funded primarily through taxes on the value of real property. Tiebout’s 
seminal 1956 paper envisioned people moving to areas with better schools, cleaner streets, and 
lower taxes, and later studies theoretically and empirically linked local public goods directly to 
housing values (Oates, 1969; Edel & Sclar, 1974). Oates (1969) in particular found that people 
are willing to pay more for housing in areas with lower property tax rates and more school 
spending per student, two findings that subsequent studies have largely supported (Wassmer, 
1993; Bradbury, Mayer, & Case, 2001; Buettner, 2003; Barrow & Rouse, 2004; Lang & Jian, 
2004). 
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 Despite the long-standing literature on local public finances and housing values, we are 
unaware of studies that explore the fundamental relationship between the property tax base, 
which may fund a variety of local amenities or tax relief, and housing values. This is likely 
because of the empirical challenge that it presents. The property tax base commonly consists of 
the value of residential property, commercial property, and undeveloped land. Because the 
values of all three are correlated, if the tax base expands in one area and not another, it is likely 
that housing values are already increasing faster in the area with the expanding tax base. An 
exception is when the property tax base includes a category of property whose value depends 
almost entirely on factors unrelated to the local real estate market. Such is the case with new 
natural gas wells in shale formations, whose existence and value depends on geology, industry-
wide technological innovation, and the national price of natural gas. 
 Innovations in technology and rising natural gas prices spurred a flurry of drilling in gas-
rich shale formations in the 2000s. Although geologists knew that shale formations around the 
U.S. contained much natural gas, the low permeability of the shale prevented cost-effective 
extraction. This changed with innovations in hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, which is a 
technique in which a mixture of water, sand, and other chemicals are injected at high pressure to 
fracture the rock (Environmental Protection Agency, 2011). Improvements in drilling horizontal 
wells, which better suited the thin shale strata, also made wells more productive. The widespread 
use of both technologies in tandem caused natural gas production in the U.S. to increase by 
approximately 35 percent over the 2005 to 2013 period (Aguilera & Radetzki 2013).  
 The first place to experience large-scale drilling was Texas’ Barnett Shale, which has had 
more wells drilled over a longer time and in a smaller area than any other shale formation in the 
world. Because natural gas wells are taxed as property in Texas, the drilling created a rapid 
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expansion in the property tax base. This presents an empirical opportunity to study the link 
between the property tax base and housing values, especially considering that the Barnett Shale 
conveniently splits the Dallas-Fort Worth area in half, with all drilling occurring on the western 
side and none occurring on the eastern side (Figure 1). The clear geological demarcation of shale 
and nonshale areas, all within the Dallas-Fort Worth regional economy, permits transparent 
comparisons and aids in separating the effect of development from confounding factors. 
Variation in geology within the shale area that is correlated with drilling intensity provides 
further variation for statistical analysis.  
 Our study looks at zip code level housing values from 1997 to 2013. The study period 
covers a decade of development: drilling started in the early 2000s, peaked in 2008, and by 2013 
had slowed to the level observed in 2001. This particular study of the Barnett Shale departs from 
existing studies of shale development on housing values (Gopalakrishnan & Klaiber, 2013; 
Muehlenbachs, Spiller, & Timmins 2012, 2015; Boslett, Guilfoos, & Lang, 2015), which focus 
on Pennsylvania–a state that excludes oil and gas wells from property taxes. Consequently, 
development would have no clear effect on housing values via the tax base, and the authors 
understandably omit discussion of how public finance policy may shape the welfare 
consequences of shale development.  
We find that taxing of oil and gas wells as property led to systematic increases in housing 
values, with shale zip codes retaining a 9 percent advantage in housing values relative to 
nonshale zip codes in 2013, well after drilling had slowed. Housing values closely followed 
changes in the oil and gas property tax base, with each $1 per student increase in tax base 
associated with a $0.15 increase in the value of the typical house. The expansion in the tax base 
was also associated with marginally higher revenues for schools and a nine percent decrease in 
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the property tax rate levied by school districts. Holding the tax base constant, we also find some 
evidence that the cumulative number of wells drilled nearby lowered housing values, indicating 
that shale development may reduce local resident welfare in the absence of policies to increase 
local public revenues.  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Resource extraction can affect public finances and therefore tax rates and public spending 
(Caselli & Michaels, 2013; Raimi & Newell, 2014). All else constant, an expanded tax base 
brought about by extraction should allow local governments to provide more public services or 
lower tax rates or both. This should make people more willing to live in the area and raise 
housing values.  
 If elected authorities maximize the utility of the median voter, they will use the potential 
revenues from the expanded tax base to provide public services and lower tax rates such that the 
resident’s marginal utility of a dollar more in public services equals that of a dollar less in taxes. 
Preferences for particular public goods, or any public good, versus lower tax rates can vary 
across space. Ample research shows that the demographics of the median voter affect the 
demand for particular policies (Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973; Poterba, 1997; Courant & Loeb, 
1997; Binet, 2013). Poterba (1997), for example, finds that jurisdictions with a greater share of 
elderly residents are associated with significant reductions in per-child educational spending. 
Similarly, if voters believe that additional spending on education will not improve educational 
quality (e.g. Hanushek, 1981), they may demand that revenues be spent elsewhere or distributed 
to them through lower tax rates.  
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Another motivation for residents preferring lower tax rates is that the state government 
may sequester some of the additional revenues through a revenue equalization program, which 
states (such as Texas) have for school funding. In this case, part of the marginal dollar in tax 
revenue is exported to property-poor areas, motivating property-rich areas to lower tax rates and 
reduce the revenues that are reallocated by the State government (see Foster and Fowles (2014) 
for an example of incentives for states to export tax burdens for education spending to the 
Federal government). 
 In addition to bringing greater public spending or property tax relief, the source of the tax 
base expansion may also bring disamenities and general public costs. This is particularly salient 
for shale gas development. Public perception in the state of New York is such that residents are 
willing to pay higher electricity prices to avoid shale development (Popkin et al, 2013). One well 
can involve hundreds of truck trips for each well, creating noise and reducing air quality 
(Kargbo, Wilhelm, & Campbell, 2010; Litovitz et al., 2013). This can in turn degrade 
infrastructure and affect human health (Hill, 2013; Abramzon et al., 2014). The degradation of 
roads and bridges from increased truck traffic would require public spending for restoration. 
Similarly, local governments may incur costs to ameliorate disamenities or enforce protective 
measures like buffer zones or fences between gas infrastructure and residences. 
 How much a tax base expansion is capitalized into housing values reflects in part how 
much it funds restorative or protective measures, which seek to merely maintain amenities, rather 
than funding improvements in amenities or reductions in tax rates. For example, the truck traffic 
association with drilling might double the public road expenditures needed to maintain a certain 
stock of roadway. If the costs of drilling, broadly understood, exceed the revenues that it 
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generates, there may even be negative relationships between the oil and gas tax base and housing 
values.  
 The rate of capitalization also reflects expectations about the persistence of the tax base 
expansion and the effectiveness of public management of additional revenues. Prospective 
homebuyers will pay a smaller premium if they expect higher public revenues to last only a few 
years. Similarly, buyers are unlikely to pay more for a house in an area with a large tax base if 
the revenue generated by it is spent poorly. The cross-country literature on natural resources has 
many examples of poorly managed windfalls and eroded institutions (Van der Ploeg, 2011). 
Within-country evidence also exists–Caselli and Michaels (2013) found that the flow of public 
goods and services observed in Brazilian municipalities was smaller than expected given their 
large oil revenue windfalls, suggesting what they termed as “missing money.”  
 
Hypothesized Relationships Guiding the Empirical Analysis 
Figure 2 depicts the hypothesized relationships between drilling, local public finances, and 
housing values. Prior to drilling, the property tax base consists of non-oil and gas property; 
namely land, residential property, and commercial property. With a boom in drilling, the value of 
wells constitutes oil and gas property wealth and expands the total property tax base. The 
expanded tax base, in turn, could cause a decline in tax rates, an increase in school funding, or an 
increase in public amenities such as parks and libraries. Any one of these changes should make 
the locality a more attractive place to live and increase housing values. Though not shown, we 
also note that changes in housing values could eventually change the residential property tax 
base and in turn the total property tax base and local public finances. This potential reinforcing 
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feed-back effect is still rightly attributed to the initial change in the oil and gas tax base and may 
be captured by an empirical analysis over a longer time frame. 
 The arrow directly linking drilling to housing values reflects the possibility that 
disamenities from drilling such as increased noise and traffic could reduce housing values. 
Unless such disamenities are controlled for, the empirical relationship between oil and gas 
property wealth and housing values would reflect the positive effect of the tax base expansion 
with the negative effect of drilling disamenities.  
  Though not shown, drilling may affect housing values through several other channels. 
By increasing economic activity, it may affect the value of land or commercial property and 
ultimately housing values. Or, an increase in labor demand and therefore housing demand could 
also raise values. Lastly, housing values might increase because of the rising value of natural gas 
rights attached to residential property. We empirically examine all three possibilities in later 
sections.   
  
BARNETT SHALE DEVELOPMENT 
The Barnett Shale lies in northeastern Texas, with its eastern boundary splitting the Dallas-Fort 
Worth metropolitan region in half. Drilling companies in the Barnett Shale led the advancement 
of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling (Rahm, 2011). Mitchell Energy pioneered 
experimentation with hydraulic fracturing in the Barnett in the 1990s with mixed success. But by 
2001 refinements in fracking and its combination with horizontal drilling began yielding fruit. In 
the following years the industry’s widespread skepticism of the Barnett evaporated as natural gas 
prices increased and more than justified the higher cost of fracking and drilling horizontal wells 
(Zuckerman, 2013).  
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 The Barnett Shale zip codes used in this study show very little drilling activity in the 
1997 through 2000 period, with less than 200 wells drilled each year (Figure 3). Drilling 
increased throughout the early 2000s and peaked in 2008 when nearly 1,800 wells were drilled. 
With the drop in natural gas prices in 2009, drilling fell by more than a half. The decline 
continued, with fewer wells drilled in 2013 than in 2000. Texas Railroad Commission (2015) 
data on drilling permits and production for the entire Barnett Shale show a similar pattern. 
Because production lags drilling, total natural gas production from the Barnett peaked in 2012 
and declined afterwards (Texas Railroad Commission, 2015). 
 
Oil and Gas Property Assessment and Taxation  
In Texas, oil and gas wells enter the property tax base once production begins. Private assessors, 
contracted by counties, value each well by estimating the present value of income that it will 
generate given projected production and prices. Values are reassessed annually to reflect new 
information, such as changes in prices. Unsurprisingly, as drilling expanded in the Barnett, the 
average oil and gas property tax base in shale zip codes increased by roughly $85,000 per student 
over nine years, which represents an nearly 25% increase over the total property tax base for the 
average zip code in 2000 (Figure 3, right axis). The oil and gas tax base then declined 
substantially in 2011 and continued declining in 2012 and 2013. The one-year lag between the 
decline in drilling and the decline in the oil and gas tax base reflects the lag between when a well 
is drilled and its first assessment. 
 In Texas, energy companies pay the majority of property taxes on oil and gas wells. 
Separate taxes are paid by the entities with a royalty interest (i.e. the owner of the oil and gas 
rights) and the entities with a working interest (i.e. the energy company) in the well. Suppose 
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that the owner of the oil and gas rights within a parcel (who may or may not own the parcel’s 
surface) leased the parcel to an energy company for a 12.5 percent royalty rate, and the company 
subsequently drilled a well. The owner would pay property taxes on 12.5 percent of the well’s 
value, and the company would pay taxes on the remaining 87.5 percent.
1
 Because royalty rates 
are typically below 25 percent (Brown, Fitzgerald, Weber, 2015), the energy company pays the 
majority of taxes associated with the well, though some of the burden may pass-through to 
subsurface owners through lower royalty rates. 
 
DATA AND SAMPLE 
Our full sample contains all the zip codes in the Dallas-Fort Worth region where less than 75 
percent of the area was urban as defined by the 2000 Census and where Zillow housing data are 
available over the years 1997 to 2013. We focus on semi-urban or suburban zip codes because 
that is where most drilling occurred. The focus also helps to create a more homogenous sample 
since inner-city zip codes likely have different housing markets and public finance dynamics 
than more suburban zip codes.   
 The full sample has 79 zip codes, with 37 shale zip codes and 42 nonshale zip codes. 
Shale zip codes are defined as those entirely within the Barnett Shale, while nonshale zip codes 
are those entirely outside of the Barnett. Defining zip codes in this way–as opposed to a measure 
of drilling activity–ensures that the classification is based entirely on an exogenous characteristic 
(the underlying geological formation) and not endogenous factors such as drilling decisions. 
Moreover, widespread drilling occurred across shale zip codes, with only a few zip codes having 
few or no wells. This can be seen in Figure 4, which shows shale and nonshale sample zip codes, 
                                                          
1
 Details on oil and gas property tax assessment in Texas are available at 
www.isouthwestdata.com/client/downloads/wisecad/APPRAISAL/Mineral%20Appraisal%20Handout.pdf 
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the eastern boundary of the shale formation, and the location of wells drilled between 2000 and 
2013.  
 We use the zip code-level Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI) as our measure of housing 
values. Prior studies of housing values have used Zillow data, including Sanders (2012) and 
Huang and Tang (2012). The ZHVI is Zillow’s estimate of the median value of single-family 
residences, condominiums, and cooperative housing in the specified area. The estimate is based 
on information from properties collected from public records, including sale price and home 
characteristics. The appendix further describes the ZHVI and compares it with the widely known 
S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index.
2
 In addition to the ZHVI being publically available and 
having desirable properties as an index, the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index is not available 
at the zip code-level in Texas.  
 As illustrated in Figure 2, shale development likely affects housing values through its 
effects on local public finances. We consider four finance-related variables: (1) the oil and gas 
property tax base; (2) the tax base excluding oil and gas and residential property; (3) the school 
district property tax rate; and, (4) school district revenues. The tax base, excluding oil and gas 
and residential property, consists of the assessed value of undeveloped land, commercial 
property, and a small residual “other” category.  
 To account for variation in population across zip codes, all variables except the tax rate 
are per enrolled student. The tax base and school revenue data are from the Texas Education 
Agency; the Texas Bond Review Board reports the property tax rate. The data are available 
starting in 2000. All variables are allocated from the school district-level to the zip code-level 
based on the share of the zip code in each particular school district. More than three-quarters of 
                                                          
2
 All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher’s website 
and use the search engine to locate the article at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgibin/jhome/34787. 
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the area of the typical zip code lies in just one school district. Appendix section A.2 further 
describes the sources and creation of these variables. The school finance data cover the 2000 to 
2013 period. 
 Some of the empirical models also employ data from three additional sources. High-
resolution spatial data on shale geology (thickness and depth) come from the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory. The timing and number of wells drilled in a zip code are based on well data 
from DrillingInfo, a provider of proprietary data on oil and gas leasing and drilling. In addition, 
we use national wellhead natural gas prices from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
 Table 1 provides the means for the public finance variables for shale and nonshale zip 
codes for the year 2000. All monetary values are in constant 2010 dollars. The average zip code 
had a property tax base of $350,000 per student, with residential property accounting for roughly 
half of the base. The schools in the average zip code had a property tax rate of 1.54 percent, had 
nearly 19,000 students, and received $9,300 in revenue (from all sources) per student. 
Comparing means across shale and nonshale zip codes reveals that shale zip codes, on average, 
had a slightly larger tax base and a higher tax rate while both groups had similar revenues per 
student and similar residential property tax bases.  
    From Table 1 we also see that shale zip codes had minimal drilling activity in 2000, 
with only 0.03 wells drilled per square kilometer. That changed over the following 13 years, with 
the cumulative number of wells drilled in average shale zip codes reaching 1.94 wells per square 
kilometer in 2013. Nonshale zip codes, in contrast, had essentially no wells drilled over the 
period. Table 1 also shows that shale and nonshale zip codes had statistically similar levels and 
growth rates in housing values prior to large-scale shale development. For the four years from 
1997 to 2000, the average annual ZHVI was $151,800 for shale zip codes and $148,700 for 
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nonshale zip codes. Moreover, the growth rates in the ZHVI were essentially identical, at three 
percent.  
 
METHODS 
Our empirical analysis consists of first documenting how average differences across shale and 
nonshale zip codes evolved over time for key variables. Then we directly link changes in the oil 
and gas tax base to housing values using an instrumental variable approach. 
 
Dynamic Shale Effects on Housing Values and Local Public Finances  
We estimate how housing values evolved over time and across zip codes in and out of the shale 
using,  
𝑍𝐻𝑉𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖 + (𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝒀𝒕
′)𝜷 + 𝒀𝒕𝜶+𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,     (1) 
where the ZHVI is either in levels or in log form and 𝜃𝑖 is a zip code fixed effect. 𝒀𝒕 is a vector 
of year binary variables, corresponding to the years 1998 to 2013, with 1997 being the excluded 
year. Shale is a binary variable indicating that a zip code is in the shale. It does not enter the 
regression by itself because it is time invariant and is therefore absorbed by the zip code fixed 
effect. However, the coefficients on the interaction between Shale and the year binary variables 
(𝜷) show how housing values evolved differently for shale and nonshale zip codes, conditional 
on the zip code fixed effect.  
 The same estimation approach is taken to explore changes in local public finances. The 
only difference is that the public finance variables are available starting in 2000, so the excluded 
year dummy variable corresponds to 2000 instead of 1997. 
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 The shale binary variable is based entirely on the geological attributes of the zip codes 
and is therefore exogenous to human action. It is possible that a time-varying shock unrelated to 
shale development affected shale and nonshale zip codes differently, and we consider potential 
confounding shocks in a later section. In absence of such a shock, the shale variable captures the 
evolving average effect of shale development on housing values and local public finances.  
 
Capitalization of the Oil and Gas Tax Base into Housing Values 
As Figure 2 highlights, housing values depend on tax rates and the provision of public goods, 
which in turn depend on the tax base. Consider a model linking housing values in time t to the 
level of the oil and gas tax base in the prior year while controlling for a zip code and time fixed 
effect: 
𝑍𝐻𝑉𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡+ 𝛽 ∙ 𝑂𝐺 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−1+𝜀𝑖𝑡       (2) 
where 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 are zip code and year fixed effects and OG Tax Base is the oil and gas tax base 
($10,000 per student) in the prior year. The lagged change in the tax base is used because tax 
assessments in one year provide revenues for the following year. Differencing (2) from one 
period to the next removes the zip code fixed effect: 
Δ𝑍𝐻𝑉𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  Δ𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 ∙  Δ𝑂𝐺 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−1+Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡,   (3) 
where the change in the year fixed effects can be captured by dummy variables corresponding to 
year pairs, with the 2000-2001 year-pair excluded. 
 If the ZHVI is defined in units of $10,000, the coefficient on the change in the oil and gas 
tax base gives the dollar-value change in the value of the typical home for each dollar increase in 
the oil and gas tax base per student. If the change in the natural logarithm of the ZHVI is the 
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dependent variable, the coefficient gives the percent change in housing values for a $10,000 per 
student increase in the oil and gas tax base.  
 Equation (3) is estimated in two ways. The first way exploits annual variation in the oil 
and gas tax base, where Δ refers to the change from one year to the next (e.g., 2000 to 2001). 
This particular specification assumes that housing markets quickly capitalize changes in the tax 
base. The second approach exploits the net change from 2000 to 2013 by converting the dataset 
into a cross-section of differences by subtracting the 2000 housing value from the level in 2013 
(or, for the lagged change in the oil and gas tax base, subtracting 2000 from 2012). Using the 
change from 2000 to 2013 permits capturing capitalization that occurs over several years. It may 
also capture the effect of temporary increases in the tax base in the intervening years. An 
expansion that lasted only three years, for example, may have generated revenues that funded 
one-time improvements like new equipment at playgrounds, whose effect on housing values 
would likely persist.  
 
Identification of the Extent of Capitalization  
By only using changes in the oil and gas tax base and not changes in the total tax base, the 
specification in (3) avoids reverse causality because there is no plausible channel for housing 
values to affect the oil and gas tax base in the way that housing values affect the total tax base, 
which includes the assessed value of residential property. Nevertheless, changes in the oil and 
gas tax base reflect the leasing and drilling decisions of energy companies (and the owners of oil 
and gas rights) and may be correlated with housing appreciation. Moreover, the oil and gas tax 
base is possibly measured with error. If substantial, measurement error would attenuate the 
coefficient on the oil and gas tax base towards zero.  
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 Weber (2012, 2014) uses the location of unconventional natural gas formations to 
instrument for growth in natural gas production. Other studies have used similar resource-based 
measures and their interaction with changing market conditions, either as instruments or to 
estimate reduced-form equations similar to equation (1). These studies include Black et al 
(2005a, b) (coal dependence and coal prices), Angrist and Kugler (2008) (coca cultivation and 
coca prices), Michaels (2011) (oil endowments and time effects), Marchand (2012) (energy 
extraction dependence and price shocks), and Marchand and Weber (2015) (shale depth and oil 
and natural gas prices).   
 To address the endogeneity of drilling decisions and measurement error, we build on this 
approach by specifying the oil and gas tax base for equation 3 as a function of geology and the 
price of natural gas. Consider the model  
𝑂𝐺 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡+𝛾(𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 ∙ ln (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1)) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡
,  (4) 
 where Geology is a time-invariant measure of the geological attractiveness of drilling in 
particular zip code and 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 is the lagged price of natural gas at the wellhead. (The lagged 
price is used because well valuations are finalized by January 1st and will reflect the conditions 
of the prior year (Texas Legislative Council, 2002)).  
 Differencing equation (4) across years yields the following: 
Δ𝑂𝐺 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = Δ𝜶𝑡 + 𝛾(𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 ∙ Δln (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1))+Δ𝜇𝑖𝑡.  (5) 
Differencing removes the zip code fixed effect, but not the term involving time-invariant geology 
because it is interacted with the price of natural gas, which changes over time and affects the 
incentive to drill.  
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 The interaction between geology and natural gas prices provides a natural instrument for 
changes in the oil and gas tax base. To serve as an instrument, the variable must be statistically 
related to the variable it is instrumenting for, a condition commonly referred to as instrument 
relevance. Our proposed instrument should be relevant because higher prices should encourage 
more drilling and more so in areas with better geology. More wells, in turn, will increase the oil 
and gas tax base. The instrument must also be exogenous, in that the covariance between it and 
the error term in the second stage equation (equation 3) is zero. The exogeneity assumption can 
be further broken into two assumptions: 1) the instrument is randomly assigned and is therefore 
unrelated to omitted variables and 2) the instrument only affects the outcome through the stated 
channel (in this case, the oil and gas tax base), a condition often referred to as an exclusion 
restriction (see Imbens, 2014a).  
 While random assignment of prices and geology is plausible, the exclusion restriction 
may not hold. Better geology and higher prices encourage drilling, which may affect housing 
values through channels other than the tax base. (Other potential causal channels, such as the 
capitalization of the rights to revenues from natural gas production are considered in a later 
section). Most notably, drilling could create disamenities that reduce people’s willingness to live 
in a particular neighborhood. This motivates us to control for the number of wells drilled per 
square kilometer in the zip code in the last two years (labeled Wells drilled/sq. km, t, t-1). We 
combine wells drilled in the current and prior year (t and t-1) into one variable because they are 
highly correlated (correlation of 0.8), and wells drilled in the prior year may actually be 
hydraulically fracked in the current year, which is when it will generate the most disamenities. 
To capture the effect of persistent disamenities, we also control for the cumulative number of 
wells drilled per square kilometer in all years before then (Cumulative wells drilled/sq. km, t-2).  
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We note that annual well drilling and housing value data may poorly capture short-term 
disamenity effects that last only a few months. Including well density variables, nonetheless, 
controls for any effect of drilling on the value of the typical home in the zip code, which is what 
is needed to avoid confounding disamenity and tax base capitalization effects.   
 Controlling for the number of wells drilled, however, brings its own challenges. Drilling 
is potentially endogenous to housing values in the same way that the oil and gas tax base might 
be endogenous. We therefore estimate equation (3) and the corresponding first stage in equation 
(5) with and without the well density variables.  
For our instrumental variable approach, we consider three different measures of 
geological richness at the zip code level: shale thickness, shale depth, and the thickness-to-depth 
ratio. The thicker the shale the more natural gas it holds, allowing one horizontal well to draw 
more gas from its subterranean surroundings (Rokosh et al., 2009). Across the major U.S. shale 
plays, Brown, Fitzgerald, and Weber (2015) show that wells in areas with greater shale thickness 
have greater production. For the Barnett in particular, Browning et al. (2013) found that wells in 
thicker parts of the shale had greater productivity. Shale depth also matters, with wells in deeper 
shales having greater productivity but also greater costs (Kaiser & Yu, 2014). The shale 
thickness-to-depth ratio combines both attributes. To aid in interpretation, we normalize the ratio 
by average thickness-to-depth ratio for shale zip codes (which have a positive value for the 
ratio). 
We regress the cumulative number of wells drilled per square kilometer from 1997 to 
2013 on a constant and each geological measure separately (results not shown). The thickness-to-
depth ratio had the strongest correlation with drilling. A thickness-to-depth ratio twice as large as 
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that of the average shale zip code is associated with 2.7 more wells per square kilometer 
(standard error of 1.3). The thickness-to-depth ratio also had the strongest correlation with 
growth in the oil and gas property tax base. 
Normalizing the thickness-to-depth ratio makes it easier to interpret our first stage results. 
The normalization yields a ratio value of one for a zip code with a thickness-to-depth that is 
equal to the average geology of shale zip codes. The coefficient 𝛾 in (5) therefore gives the 
increase in the oil and gas tax base for a one percent increase in the price of natural gas, 
conditional on having the geology of the average shale zip code.  
 For estimation using annual changes, we present robust standard errors clustered by zip 
code. For the estimation using the change from 2000 to 2013, where each zip code appears only 
once, we present unclustered, robust standard errors. We used Stata 14 for the regression 
analysis, with instrumental variable estimates based on the “ivreg2” user-written program. 
 
RESULTS 
Dynamic Shale Effects on Housing Values and Local Public Finances  
Figures 5a-5f depict the coefficients on the interaction between the shale binary variable and the 
year dummy variables from equation (1), with the dashed lines representing 95 percent 
confidence intervals. Looking at the log of the ZHVI, shale and nonshale zip codes had housing 
values that were statistically indistinguishable from each other during the early 2000s (Figure 
5a). But from 2005 to 2013, shale zip codes had higher average values, with the difference 
peaking in 2011 and dropping substantially in 2012 and 2013. By 2013, shale zip codes retained 
a nine percent advantage in housing values. We observed a similar pattern when looking at the 
ZHVI in dollars (10,000s) (Figure 5b). 
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 The increase in housing values in shale zip codes occurred as the oil and gas tax base 
expanded dramatically. Compared to nonshale zip codes, the fixed effects model shows that the 
oil and gas tax base expanded by about $80,000 per student from 2000 to 2009 (Figure 5c). To 
put the increase in perspective, it represents 23 percent of the average total tax base, which 
includes all property categories, in 2000.  In contrast to the oil and gas property tax base, Figure 
5d shows that shale and nonshale zip codes experienced similar changes in the tax base when 
excluding residential and oil and gas property. This result alleviates concerns about other 
confounding economic factors, indicating that shale zip codes did not experience different 
economic trends–in so much as those trends affect the value of commercial property or land. Had 
the drilling boom disproportionately affected business growth in the shale area, we would expect 
an expansion in the commercial property tax base relative to the nonshale area. Figure 5d shows 
that this did not occur. 
 As the tax base expanded, school districts in shale zip codes lowered property tax rates 
(Figure 5e). By 2006 tax rates in shale zip codes had declined by nine percent decline relative to 
nonshale zip codes. Throughout the 2006 to 2013 period, the difference in tax rates was roughly 
constant, with the average shale zip code having a school property tax rate about 0.11 to 0.13 
percentage points lower than the average nonshale zip code.  
The increase in the tax base more than offset the decline in school tax rates, allowing 
school revenues to increase slightly, though the difference was statistically significant (at the ten 
percent level) only in 2009, with schools in shale zip codes receiving roughly $350 more per 
student (Figure 5f). It appears that school districts first responded to the expanded tax base by 
lowering property tax rates. By 2006 most of the decline in tax rates had occurred. With the tax 
rate roughly constant after 2006, the expansion in the tax base implied additional revenues for 
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schools. But with steady tax rates in the later part of the study period, the eventual decline in the 
tax base unsurprisingly led to a decline in school revenues. 
Besides the decline in property tax rates, one reason why the large increase in the tax 
base translated into a small increase in school revenues is because of school funding policy in 
Texas, which guarantees a certain level of funding per student. Districts whose property tax 
wealth is insufficient to generate this level receive additional funding from the state; districts 
with more than sufficient property wealth have some of their revenues captured and shared with 
less affluent districts. As such, a district that experiences an increase in property tax wealth 
would receive fewer transfers from the state and, if the district were sufficiently wealthy, some 
of its revenues would be recaptured by the state (TTARA, 2012). In this manner the policy limits 
the transmission of property wealth increases into local school revenues.   
  Figure 6 combines two key results: the relationship between a zip code’s shale status and 
changes in the oil and gas tax base and shale status and changes in housing values. Housing 
values closely track growth in the oil and gas tax base, with a lag of one or two years.  
 
Capitalization of the Oil and Gas Tax Base into Housing Values 
The first stage equation (5) is estimated using annual changes in the tax base and the change 
from 2000 to 2013. The model based on annual changes indicates that a one percent increase in 
the price of natural gas leads to a roughly $30 per student increase in the oil and gas tax base for 
a zip code with the average thickness-to-depth ratio among shale zip codes (Table 2). Regardless 
of whether the density of wells is controlled for, the F-statistic remains large enough to dismiss 
concerns about weak instrument bias (18.0 and 19.2).  
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 Using the change from 2000 to 2013 gives a coefficient of a different sign on the 
geology-price interaction. This is expected given the decline in real natural gas prices over the 
period, meaning that zips codes with better than average geology had larger negative values of 
the interaction term, but because of the better geology they also had larger increases in their tax 
bases, causing the negative correlation. Specifically, conditional on a one percent decrease in the 
price of natural gas, the oil and gas tax base increased by $60 per student for the average shale 
zip code and by $28 when controlling for well density. The corresponding F-statistics were 19.8 
and 5.4, indicating sufficient instrument strength when not controlling for well density. 
 We estimate the second-stage equation (3) using OLS and the instrumental variable 
approach. For each estimation type, we present results for the logged and non-logged ZHVI and 
with and without controlling for well density. We also present the results based on annual 
changes (Panel A of Table 3) and based on changes over the 2000 to 2013 period (Panel B of 
Table 3).  
 The estimates from the annual IV approach indicate that a $10,000 increase in the oil and 
gas tax base per student increases housing values by 0.6 percent (significant at the 10 percent 
level) (Table 3). In levels, each one-dollar increase in the tax base led to a roughly $0.15 increase 
in housing values (significant at the five percent level). As expected with measurement error in 
the oil and gas tax base, the OLS results are about a third smaller in magnitude, though they are 
more precisely estimated. Controlling for well density slightly increases the IV point estimates 
but with marginally larger standard errors.  
 Using the change over the 2000 to 2013 period tends to give larger estimates of 
capitalization. We note that the IV results in the columns 4 and 8 of Panel B (Table 3) are 
associated with a weak first stage and likely suffer from weak instrument bias. Those estimates 
 23 
 
aside, the IV estimates when not controlling for well density (columns 3 and 6) indicate that a 
$10,000 increase in the oil and gas tax base per student increases housing values by 1.7 percent 
(significant at the 5 percent level). In dollar terms, the estimates are similar to the annual-based 
estimates, with each one-dollar increase in the tax base leading to a $0.15 increase in housing 
values (significant at the 10 percent level). The average shale zip code experienced a $43,500 
increase in the oil and gas property tax base per student from 2000 to 2012. All else constant, this 
implies an increase in housing values of 7.4 percent or $6,525.   
 The coefficient on the density of wells drilled in the current or prior period varies in sign 
and is always statistically insignificant. The cumulative density of wells drilled shows a more 
consistent pattern of decreasing home values, though these estimates tend to have large standard 
errors and be statistically indistinguishable from zero. The most precisely estimated effect is that 
a one-unit increase in the lagged cumulative number of wells drilled decreases housing values by 
$320 (significant at the one percent level). By 2011, the average shale zip code had a cumulative 
well density of 1.85 wells, implying a nearly $600 dollar decrease in housing values from 2012 
to 2013. Because wells persist for many years, this effect of cumulative well density could 
continue to exert downward pressure on housing values over time. Our measure of cumulative 
wells, however, does not drop wells as they age. At some point, possibly at the capping of a well, 
the disamenity effect of old wells likely goes to zero.     
 One explanation for a negative effect of past wells drilled is that people wait until drilling 
has subsided to sell their homes, delaying when the externalities are reflected in the ZHVI. 
Alternatively, companies frequently restimulate (or “refrack”) older wells for additional 
production. Having more wells drilled in prior years would then be associated with more 
refracking – and therefore more truck traffic and noise ‒ in the present. 
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Making Sense of the Capitalization Estimates 
Our annual estimate of capitalization indicates that a one-dollar per student increase in the oil 
and gas tax base is associated with a $0.15 increase in the typical housing value. Is this 
plausible? Consider the present value of the discounted flow of public revenues from the 
expansion. Over the study period the average tax rate for properties in shale counties was 2.37%, 
including school and community college taxes, city taxes, and county taxes. A dollar more in tax 
base per student therefore generates $0.0237 in public revenues per year per student. Because the 
number of students roughly equals the number of housing units according to the 2000 Decennial 
Census, the same revenue increase applies to each housing unit.  
 If local officials manage revenues to maximize resident utility, the typical resident values 
a marginal dollar in public income the same as private income. The discount rate that equalizes a 
present value of $0.15 with an infinite stream of payments of $0.0237 is 16 percent 
(=0.0237/0.15). The implied discount rate is plausible. Uncertainty over the persistence of the tax 
base expansion would cause homeowners to have a higher discount rate. In the extreme, the 
homeowner would assume that payments (in the form of tax savings or as greater public 
services) cease after several years. This is consistent with an expectation that the rate of drilling 
and the taxable value of existing wells will decline over time. In addition to the cessation of 
payments, some of the revenues raised are likely spent addressing public costs associated with 
the industry and are therefore unavailable to be passed on as tax savings or to fund additional 
public services.  
 
ROBUSTNESS ACROSS SAMPLES 
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Creating More Homogenous Subsamples 
Although assignment of zip codes to shale and nonshale groups is based on geology, some shale 
zip codes may have characteristics unlike that of any nonshale zip code. These initial differences 
in turn may have affected the evolution of housing values during the study period. We therefore 
define two subsamples where shale and nonshale zip codes are arguably more comparable than 
in the full sample. 
 The first subsample improves comparability based on initial socio-economic 
characteristics. Limiting the analysis to treatment (shale) and control (nonshale) observations 
with similar characteristics can make causal inference more robust, accurate, and efficient (Ho et 
al., 2007; Crump et al., 2009). As Imbens (2014b) shows, linear regression methods can give 
excessive influence to treatment observations in an area of the covariate space lacking control 
observations or vice versa. This has motivated researchers to estimate and use the propensity 
score‒the probability of treatment, in this case the probability of being a shale zip code, given a 
set of observed covariates (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983)–to systematically select a sample as a 
precursor to regression (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
A perfect predictor of being a shale zip code is an indicator variable for being in the 
shale, but using only socioeconomic variables to estimate the propensity to be a shale zip code 
captures differences other than geology. Because the propensity score is a one-dimensional 
summary of observable differences between shale and nonshale zip codes, trimming on it 
removes shale zip codes that are substantially different from any nonshale zip code and vice 
versa, thereby improving comparability.  
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 We use 14 socioeconomic and housing-related variables from the 2000 Census to 
estimate the propensity score on the full sample of zip codes. Each one of the fourteen variables 
enters linearly into a bivariate Probit model. The variables employed include demographic 
variables (share of the population that is white, the share in three different age groups, the share 
with some college education), income variables (the share of the population in three different 
household income categories, median household income), urbanization variables (the percent of 
the zip code in an urban area, population density) and real estate variables (the percent of vacant 
housing units, the median year built, median real estate taxes). These are common control 
variables in housing value studies: Schwartz and Zorn, 1988 (population density and age 
demographics); Santiago et al., 2001 (real estate taxes and income); Ellen and Voicu, 2006 
(proximity indicators); Di et al., 2010 (racial demographics); Bifulco, 2012 (age and racial 
demographics). Clearly, other factors affect housing values, but as previously mentioned, 
identification of the oil and gas tax base capitalization comes from spatial variation in geology 
and temporal variation in natural gas prices, both of which should be unrelated to local housing 
market shocks (excluding those related to shale development). 
To trim the sample based on the propensity score, Crump et al. (2009) and Imbens 
(2014b) provide a data-driven method to calculate optimal cutoffs. The cutoffs are based on the 
asymptotic efficiency bound of the average treatment effect, which will presumably have greater 
variance in areas of the covariate space with a large disparity in the number of treatment versus 
control observations. We calculate the optimal cutoff for the propensity score by finding the 
cutoff that minimizes the function specified in Imbens (2014b) (p. 31). We find a cutoff of 0.044 
and therefore drop zip codes with a propensity score lower than 0.044 or higher than 0.956 (=1 - 
0.044). This leaves a sample of 69 zip codes.  
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The second subsample used as a robustness check is trimmed based on the distance from 
the zip code centroid to the boundary of the Barnett Shale that divides the Dallas-Fort Worth 
region in half. Given the dependency of real estate markets on location-specific factors, zip codes 
closer to each other should be more comparable than zip codes further away, in which case 
trimming outlying zip codes should improve comparability. We trim the 25 percent of zip codes 
furthest from the shale boundary, either to the west or to the east. This gives a subsample of 59 
zip codes, all of which are less than 45 kilometers from the shale boundary.  
We present estimates based on the two trimmed subsamples for all estimates previously 
shown for the full sample.  
 
Estimates for Subsamples 
Both the propensity score-trimmed sample and the distance-trimmed sample show an evolution 
of housing values across shale and nonshale zip codes similar to that revealed by the full sample 
and shown in Figure 5 (see Appendix Figures A.1 and A.2). Shale and nonshale zip codes had 
similar housing values in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but then values diverged in the mid 
2000s in favor of shale zip codes. Both subsamples show that the difference in values peaked 
around 2010-2011 and declined in subsequent years. According to both subsamples, in 2013 
housing values in shale zip codes remained higher than in nonshale zip codes by roughly six 
percent.  
  Both subsamples also reveal similar changes in local public finances. The oil and gas tax 
base increased dramatically, peaking at in 2009, with the difference between shale and nonshale 
zip codes having widened by about $85,000 per student. Both subsamples also show no 
systematic differences in the tax base when excluding oil and gas and residential property. 
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Regarding tax rates, in both cases, shale zip codes are shown to have systematically lower 
property tax rates in the later 2000s.  
 The school revenue results differ slightly between the full sample and the two 
subsamples. The propensity-score-trimmed sample shows a larger and more persistent increase 
in school revenues per student in shale zip codes. From 2007 to 2010 school districts in shale zip 
codes had roughly $500 more revenues per student than nonshale zip codes. The distance-
trimmed sample shows a similar evolution over time but with smaller point estimates (around 
$300 to $400) and larger standard errors. 
 Moving to the capitalization estimates, we first verify the instrument strength for both 
subsamples (Appendix Table A1). The point estimates and F statistics are very similar to those 
from the full sample. As with the full sample, when looking at the change in the tax base from 
2000 to 2013, the instrument is weak if the well density variables are included, otherwise the F 
statistics range from 11.0 to 19.3. 
 The capitalization estimates are robust to removing the shale and nonshale zip codes with 
the most unique initial socio-economic characteristics. The estimates based on the propensity-
score-trimmed (Table 4) are similar to those from the full sample, both in magnitude and 
precision. The estimates for the effects on well density are also qualitatively similar, with mixed 
signs for recent wells and generally negative effects for the cumulative density of wells drilled.  
 The capitalization estimates based on the distance-trimmed sample are marginally smaller 
than those from the full or propensity-score-trimmed sample (Table 5). Using annual changes, 
the distance-trimmed sample indicates that a one-dollar per student increase in the oil and gas tax 
base is associated with a $0.10 increase in the value of the typical home (columns 7 and 8 of 
Panel A in Table 5). The changes from 2000 to 2013 also give smaller capitalization estimates 
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when compared with the full or propensity-score-trimmed samples. The marginally smaller point 
estimates combined with larger standard errors, likely stemming from the decline in sample size 
(only 59 zip codes) erodes the statistical significance of the estimates. Looking at the well 
density results, the coefficients remain qualitatively similar but are also statistically insignificant.  
 The slightly smaller capitalization estimates for the distance-trimmed sample might be 
because zip codes closer to the shale boundary tend to be more urban and have a larger initial tax 
base. The average initial tax base of the distance-trimmed sample is six percent larger than the 
full sample average tax base and nine percent larger than that of the propensity-score-trimmed 
sample. A given change in the oil and gas tax base would therefore have a smaller proportional 
effect on the tax base in the distance-trimmed sample than for the other samples. 
  
ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS AND CONFOUNDING FACTORS 
We interpret the statistical relationship between the oil and gas property tax base and housing 
values as reflecting the causal effect of the tax base. There are several potential confounding 
factors that might suggest a different interpretation. 
 
 A Correlation with Labor and Housing Demand 
One interpretation of our findings is that the oil and gas tax base correlates with greater 
economic activity from drilling (e.g. Weber, 2012, 2014; Brown, 2014), which increased the 
demand for labor and housing. The large labor and housing market in the Dallas-Fort Worth 
region makes it unlikely that a relatively small labor shock would cause wage or housing 
appreciation and any localized effects should be captured by controlling for drilling activity. 
Moreover, if the correlation between the tax base and appreciation reflects labor shocks, we 
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should see a smaller correlation when looking at the change from 2000 to 2013: by 2013 drilling 
had slowed to below 2001 levels, so drilling-related labor demand would have been negligible. 
Yet, appreciation from 2000 to 2013 shows an even larger effect of the oil and gas tax base. 
 We nonetheless probe this explanation further by estimating whether shale and nonshale 
counties had different employment trends in the shale boom and post-boom periods, where shale 
and nonshale counties are those containing the shale and nonshale zip codes of the full sample. 
We find that shale and nonshale counties experienced similar employment growth in the 2001 to 
2008 period, when drilling boomed, and similar declines in employment over the 2009 to 2013 
period when drilling slowed and the great recession hit (Appendix Table A2). 
 
Capitalization of Natural Gas Rights into Housing Values 
Another explanation is that housing values capitalize the rights to revenue from natural gas 
production, which are correlated with the oil and gas tax base. We do not control for local 
ownership of natural gas rights, or the value of natural gas production, which would affect the 
value of those rights. Evidence suggests that capitalization of natural gas rights is not the primary 
cause of greater appreciation in shale zip codes. Tarrant County has the most shale zip codes in 
our sample. Timmins and Vissing (2014) look at all the housing transactions in Tarrant County 
over the 2000 to 2013 period and show that having an active lease increases the value of the 
home by just four percent. Since only 28 percent of the housing transactions in their study 
involved an active lease, leasing would account for an average increase in housing values of just 
one percent. This is consistent with Weber and Hitaj (2015), which find evidence from farm real 
estate values in the Barnett Shale that surface owners generally do not own the rights to the gas 
beneath the surface. 
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Furthermore, if natural gas rights reflect the expected revenues from royalties, the 50 
percent decline in the price of natural gas at the end of 2008 (and persistently low prices 
afterward) would have substantially decreased their values, and with it, housing values in shale 
areas. We observe the opposite: relative to nonshale zip codes, housing in shale zip codes 
continued to gain value in 2008, 2009, and 2010.    
 
Confounding Construction and Housing Market Shocks  
Although our shale measures are uncorrelated with the level or growth in housing values prior to 
development of the Barnett Shale, the national housing boom and bust and subsequent recession, 
which the Dallas-Fort Worth region was not immune to, may have affected shale areas 
differently than nonshale areas. Using county-level data on building permits for 2000 through 
2013, we find that shale counties did not experience greater growth in construction during the 
2000 through 2008 period; nor did the bust disproportionately affect them (Appendix Table A3).  
 
CONCLUSION 
For Texas’ Barnett Shale, we study how resource abundance and extraction affected the local 
property tax base, property tax rates, school funding, and ultimately, housing values. Because the 
value of natural gas wells is taxed as real property in Texas, a boom and bust in natural gas 
prices and in drilling in the Barnett Shale caused large changes in the oil and gas tax base‒and 
therefore the total tax base‒over our 2000 to 2013 study period.  
Zip codes inside the shale appreciated more than those just outside the shale from the 
early 2000s to about 2011 and retained a nine percent advantage in housing values in 2013, five 
years after the rate of drilling began to slow. Taxation of natural gas wells as property provides 
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the primary explanation for the greater appreciation. Appreciation closely followed changes in 
the oil and gas tax base, which caused a 23 percent increase in the total tax base from 2000 to 
2009. The expansion allowed property tax rates to decline by nine percent and school revenues to 
increase modestly. Using spatial variation in geology and temporal variation in natural gas 
prices, we directly estimate how changes in the oil and gas tax base are capitalized into housing 
values and find that a $1 per student increase in the oil and gas property tax base led to a $0.15 
increase in the value of the typical home.  
Without taxation of natural gas wells as property, drilling in the Barnett Shale would 
have had a minimal effect on the property tax base and a potentially negative effect on housing 
values. Some results suggest that the cumulative density of wells drilled in a zip code lowers 
housing values, which is consistent with opposition to shale development in parts of the U.S. and 
abroad where there are fewer channels for extractive activities to fund local public institutions. It 
is also consistent with Muehlenbachs et al. (2012, 2015) and Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber (2013) 
who both found negative effects for some types of properties in Pennsylvania, a state that does 
not tax oil and gas wells as property. 
Our findings highlight how the consequences of natural resource development can hinge 
on having policies that turn natural resource windfalls into benefits enjoyed more broadly and for 
a longer time. Regardless of whether someone in New York owns the natural gas in the ground 
in Tarrant County, Texas, state policy ensures that she will pay property taxes on the value of 
any associated wells. Absentee ownership of resources, therefore, does not preclude local 
financial benefits of resource abundance. Property taxes in particular fund schools and public 
services where extraction occurs. This is in contrast to severance taxes which generate revenue 
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for state governments that spend revenues broadly, potentially leaving schools and local 
governments in producing areas with modest, if any, financial gains. 
The long-term effects of resource abundance on a locality likely depend on channels for 
revenues from development to fund enduring public amenities. Property tax cuts that can be 
sustained for only a few years likely have large but short-lived effects on welfare and housing 
values. With such a policy, part of the associated private financial gains will be spent on 
consumption or invested outside the locality and therefore generate modest, if any, long-term 
local benefits. In contrast, property tax windfalls spent on new parks and school buildings or 
improved roads and sidewalks, which can last for decades and are inherently tied to the locality, 
could have more enduring effects, especially if they encourage private investment and help 
maintain the value of the total tax base. Our results show that school districts spent at least some 
of their windfalls on property tax relief. We did not explore if city, municipal, or county 
governments responded similarly or if they invested or saved their revenue windfalls.  
Our observations regarding resource-induced tax base shocks can be generalized in part. 
Resources like oil or gas are exhaustible and will often provide a one-time tax base windfall, 
which is distinct from general oscillations in real estate values or from the building of a large 
commercial property that provides a more enduring tax base expansion. Nevertheless, the same 
causal relationships between the tax base, local amenities, tax rates, and housing values likely 
hold in a variety of contexts.  
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. The Barnett Shale Splits the Dallas-Fort Worth Region 
Source: Elaboration by the authors using spatial data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (shale area) 
and the U.S. Census Bureau (urban areas).    
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Figure 2. Linking Shale Development and Housing Values  
Note: Elaboration by the authors. 
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Figure 3. Wells Drilled and the Oil and Gas Property Tax Base in Shale Zip Codes, 1997-2013 
Source: Elaboration by the authors using data from DrillingInfo (wells) and the Texas Education Agency  (oil and gas property tax base). Shale and nonshale zip 
codes are as defined in the Data and Sample section. 
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Figure 4. Shale and Nonshale Zip Codes and Wells Drilled 
Note: Elaboration by the authors using data from DrillingInfo (wells), the U.S. Energy Information Administration (shale boundary), and the Census Bureau 
(urban areas). County names are in bold. Sample zip codes are those for which Zillow housing value data are available for the study period and that are less than 
75 percent urban. Shale zip codes are those sample zip codes entirely within the shale; nonshale zip codes are those entirely outside of the shale. 
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Figure 5. The Change in Conditional Mean Differences Across Shale and Nonshale Zip Codes  
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Figure 6. The Oil and Gas Tax Base and Housing Values 
Note: The solid line represents the coefficients on the Shale and year interactions estimated using equation (1). The dashed line represents the coefficients on the 
Shale and year interactions estimated using the same equation but with the oil and gas tax base as the dependent variable. The excluded year for the housing 
value regression is 1997; for the oil and gas tax base regression it is 2000. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for sample zip codes 
              
 
Public Finance Variables, 2000 Levels 
 
All (N=79) 
Shale 
(N=37) 
Nonshale 
(N=42) Difference in 
Means 
Statistically Different 
Means? (P-value)   Mean S.D. Mean Mean 
Total property tax base 
($10,000/student) 
35.0 18.6 
38.2 32.2 6.0 
0.16 
   Oil and gas 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.00 
   Residential 18.2 9.3 18.3 18.2 0.1 0.95 
   Non-O&G, non-residential 16.6 12.3 19.5 14.0 5.4 0.05 
School property tax rate (%) 1.54 0.11 1.58 1.50 0.1 0.00 
School revenues ($/student) 9,356 992 9,444 9,278 166 0.46 
Total students (1,000s) 1.87 3.40 1.16 2.49 -1.3 0.08 
  Drilling Activity (Wells per Square Kilometer) 
Wells drilled in 2000 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04 
Cumulative wells drilled, 2000-2013 0.91 1.52 1.94 0.00 1.94 0.00 
  Pre-Boom Levels and Trends in Housing Values, 1997-2000 
Annual ln(ZHVI) 11.86 0.34 11.88 11.84 0.04 0.26 
Annual ZHVI ($10,000) 15.01 5.51 15.18 14.87 0.31 0.62 
Annual Δ ln(ZHVI) 0.033 0.039 0.034 0.031 0.003 0.57 
Annual Δ ZHVI ($10,000) 0.45 0.56 0.50 0.41 0.09 0.22 
Source: Data are from Zillow (ZHVI), the Texas Education Agency (the tax base and school spending), and the Texas Bond Review Board (property tax rates) 
and DrillingInfo (wells drilled).   
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Table 2. First-Stage results for changes in the oil and gas property tax base ($10,000/student) 
      
Panel A: Annual Changes 
Variables Δ O&G Tax Base 
(Thick_Depth)  x Δ ln(Price), t-1 0.324*** 0.281*** 
 
(0.076) (0.064) 
Wells drilled/sq. km, t, t-1 
 
1.994*** 
  
(0.394) 
Cumulative wells drilled/sq. km, t-2 
 
-0.276*** 
 
 
(0.054) 
Intercept -0.051 -0.169** 
  (0.037) (0.072) 
F statistic on (Thick_Depth)  x Δ ln(Price), t-1 18.0 19.2 
Zip codes 79 79 
Observations 948 948 
Adjusted R squared 0.14 0.27 
Panel B: Change 2000-2013 
Variables Δ O&G Tax Base 
(Thick_Depth)  x Δ ln(Price), 2000-2012 -6.569*** -2.845** 
 
(1.475) (1.219) 
Wells drilled/sq. km, 2012, 2013 
 
-0.097 
  
(4.398) 
Cumulative wells drilled/sq. km, 2011 
 
1.306** 
 
 
(0.540) 
Intercept -0.004 0.024 
  (0.167) (0.134) 
F statistic on (Thick_Depth)  x Δ ln(Price), t-1 19.8 5.4 
Zip codes 79 79 
Observations 79 79 
Adjusted R squared 0.30 0.41 
Note: ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The results in Panel A exploit 
annual variation over the 2000 to 2013 period. For these results, robust standard errors clustered by zip code are in 
parenthesis. Year dummy variables are included in the annual-based regression but excluded from the table. The 
results in Panel B are based on differencing 2000 values from 2013 values, thereby converting the panel into a cross 
section of zip codes. For these results, unclustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
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 Table 3. Capitalization of the oil and gas property tax base into housing values, full sample 
                  
 
Panel A: Annual Changes 
 
 
Δ Log(ZHVI) Δ ZHVI 
  OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV 
Δ O&G tax base ($10,000/student), t-1 0.002*** 0.002** 0.006* 0.007 0.031*** 0.026** 0.146** 0.153** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.061) (0.066) 
Wells drilled/sq. km, t, t-1 
 
0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
0.027 
 
-0.074 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.051) 
Cumulative wells drilled/sq. km, t-2 
 
-0.001* 
 
0.000 
 
-0.032*** 
 
0.008 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.020) 
Zip codes 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Observations 948 948 948 948 948 948 948 948 
Adjusted R Squared 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.57 0.57 0.51 0.51 
 
Panel B: Change 2000-2013 
 
 
Δ Log(ZHVI) Δ ZHVI 
  OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV 
Δ O&G tax base ($10,000/student), 2000-2012 0.005* 0.006** 0.017** 0.055** 0.050 0.068* 0.157* 0.554* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.027) (0.038) (0.037) (0.081) (0.285) 
Wells drilled/sq. km, 2012, 2013 
 
0.146 
 
0.106 
 
2.634 
 
2.234 
  
(0.154) 
 
(0.208) 
 
(2.699) 
 
(2.772) 
Cumulative wells drilled/sq. km, 2011 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.094 
 
-0.194 
 
-1.021* 
 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.584) 
Zip codes 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Adjusted R Squared 0.02 0.01 -0.14 -1.82 0.01 0.02 -0.10 -1.38 
Note: ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The results in Panel A exploit annual variation over the 2000 to 2013 period. For 
these results, robust standard errors clustered by zip code are in parenthesis. Year dummy variables are included in the annual-based regression but excluded 
from the table. The results in Panel B are based on differencing 2000 values from 2013 values, thereby converting the panel into a cross section of zip codes. For 
these results, unclustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
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Table 4. Capitalization of the oil and gas property tax base into housing values, propensity-score-trimmed sample 
                  
 
Panel A: Annual Changes 
 
 
Δ Log(ZHVI) Δ ZHVI 
  OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV 
Δ O&G tax base ($10,000/student), t-1 0.002** 0.002** 0.008* 0.008* 0.028*** 0.025** 0.139** 0.145** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.061) (0.067) 
Wells drilled/sq. km, t, t-1 
 
0.000 
 
-0.005 
 
0.019 
 
-0.076 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.052) 
Cumulative wells drilled/sq. km, t-2 
 
-0.002* 
 
0.000 
 
-0.031*** 
 
0.006 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.020) 
Zip codes 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Observations 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 
Adjusted R Squared 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.50 
 
Panel B: Change 2000-2013 
 
 
Δ Log(ZHVI) Δ ZHVI 
  OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV 
Δ O&G tax base ($10,000/student), 2000-2012 0.003 0.005* 0.011* 0.042* 0.043 0.065* 0.142* 0.516* 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.022) (0.037) (0.036) (0.080) (0.274) 
Wells drilled/sq. km, 2013, 2012 
 
0.126 
 
0.100 
 
2.551 
 
2.232 
  
(0.164) 
 
(0.178) 
 
(2.750) 
 
(2.720) 
Cumulative wells drilled/sq. km, 2011 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.076 
 
-0.210 
 
-0.965* 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.554) 
Zip codes 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Adjusted R Squared 0.01 0.00 -0.12 -1.73 0.00 0.01 -0.10 -1.40 
Note: ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The results in Panel A exploit annual variation over the 2000 to 2013 period. For 
these results, robust standard errors clustered by zip code are in parenthesis. Year dummy variables are included in the annual-based regression but excluded 
from the table. The results in Panel B are based on differencing 2013 values from 2000 values, thereby converting the panel into a cross section of zip codes. For 
these results, unclustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The propensity-score-trimmed sample is based on trimming the full sample using optimal 
cutoffs based on the estimated propensity to be a shale zip code based on socioeconomic characteristics as described in the text.  
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Table 5. Capitalization of the oil and gas property tax base into housing values, distance-trimmed sample 
                  
 
Panel A: Annual Changes 
 
 
Δ Log(ZHVI) Δ ZHVI 
  OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV 
Δ O&G tax base ($10,000/student), t-1 0.001* 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.020** 0.015* 0.097* 0.099* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.053) (0.056) 
Wells drilled/sq. km, t, t-1 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.022 
 
-0.048 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.044) 
Cumulative wells drilled/sq. km, t-2 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-
0.026**  
0.003 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.018) 
Zip codes 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
Observations 708 708 708 708 708 708 708 708 
Adjusted R Squared 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.66 
 
Panel B: Change 2000-2013 
 
 
Δ Log(ZHVI) Δ ZHVI 
  OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV 
Δ O&G tax base ($10,000/student), 2000-2012 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.062 -0.008 0.006 0.081 0.589 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.048) (0.039) (0.056) (0.091) (0.483) 
Wells drilled/sq. km, 2013, 2012 
 
-0.177 
 
-0.087 
 
-2.638 
 
-1.778 
  
(0.106) 
 
(0.281) 
 
(1.607) 
 
(2.999) 
Cumulative wells drilled/sq. km, 2011 
 
0.006 
 
-0.095 
 
0.040 
 
-0.932 
 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.886) 
Zip codes 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
Observations 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
Adjusted R Squared -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -1.47 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -1.24 
Note: ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The results in Panel A exploit annual variation over the 2000 to 2013 period. For 
these results, robust standard errors clustered by zip code are in parenthesis. Year dummy variables are included in the annual-based regression but excluded 
from the table. The results in Panel B are based on differencing 2013 values from 2000 values, thereby converting the panel into a cross section of zip codes. For 
these results, unclustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The distance-trimmed sample is based on removing the 25 percent of zip codes in the full 
sample that were furthest from the eastern boundary of the Barnett Shale.  
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APPENDIX  
1. Zillow Housing Value Index 
The Zillow Housing Value Index (ZHVI) is robust to the changing mix of properties that sell in 
different periods because it involves estimating a sale price for every home. By incorporating the 
values of all homes in an area–not just those homes that sold–it avoids the bias associated with 
median sale prices (Dorsey et al., 2010). Unlike the ZHVI, the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price 
Index only uses information from repeat-sales properties and is value weighted, giving trends 
among more expensive homes greater influence on overall estimated price changes (S&P/Case 
Shiller, 2014; Winkler, 2013). The S&P/C-S index, nonetheless, is widely used. In the aggregate 
the ZHVI and the S&P/C-S index track closely, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.95 
and median absolute error of 1.5 percent (Humphies, 2008). Three other studies find similar 
results when comparing various versions of the two indexes, finding correlations of 0.92 or 
higher (Guerrieri et al, 2010; Schintler & Istrate, 2011; Winkler, 2013). We compared the ZHVI 
for Dallas-Fort Worth with the corresponding S&P/C-S index and found a correlation of 0.95.  
 
2.  Public Finance Data 
The Texas Education Agency’s Public Education Information Management System provides data 
on the property tax base and school revenues. Although the property tax base is reported at the 
school district level, it is the same base used by city and county governments in our study area. 
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For example, if a county and school district perfectly overlap, they would have the same property 
tax base. School property tax rates came from the Texas Bond Review Board and are a 
percentage of a property’s assessed value that is paid in annual property taxes. We allocated 
school district data to zip codes based on the percent of the zip code area in each district. 
Districts and zip codes tended to line up well, with 79 percent of the average zip code’s area 
lying in just one school district.  
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(c) Oil and Gas Tax Base 
       ($10,000 /student) 
(d) Non-O&G, Non-Residential Tax Base 
 ($10,000 /student) 
Figure A1. The Change in Conditional Mean Differences Across Shale and Nonshale Zip Codes , 
Propensity- Score-Trimmed Sample 
 
Note: The black line represents the coefficients on the interactions between the shale binary variable and the year binary 
variables estimated using equation (1). The dashed gray lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. The propensity-score-
trimmed sample includes 69 zip codes and  is based on trimming the full sample using optimal cutoffs based on the estimated 
propensity to be a shale zip code based on socioeconomic characteristics as described in the text.   
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Figure A2. The Change in Conditional Mean Differences Across Shale and Nonshale Zip Codes,  
Distance-Trimmed Sample 
 
Note: The black line represents the coefficients on the interactions between the shale binary variable and the year binary 
variables estimated using equation (1). The dashed gray lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. The distance-trimmed 
sample is based on removing the 25 percent of zip codes in the full sample that were furthest from the eastern boundary of the 
Barnett Shale, which leaves 59 zip codes. 
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Table A1. First-Stage regressions for the trimmed subsamples  
          
 
Panel A: Annual Changes 
   Δ O&G Tax Base (10,000/student) 
Variables Propensity-Score-Trimmed Sample Distance-Trimmed Sample 
(Thick_Depth)  x Δ ln(Price), t-1 0.335*** 0.291*** 0.359*** 0.320*** 
 
(0.079) (0.066) (0.100) (0.084) 
Wells drilled/sq. km, t, t-1 
 
1.970*** 
 
2.101*** 
  
(0.393) 
 
(0.427) 
Cumulative wells drilled/sq. km, t-2 
 
-0.266*** 
 
-0.304*** 
    (0.055)   (0.056) 
F statistic on (Thick_Depth)  x Δ ln(Price) 18.0 19.3 13.0 14.6 
Zip Codes 69 69 59 59 
Observations 828 828 708 708 
Adjusted R squared 0.15 0.27 0.13 0.28 
 Panel B: Change 2000-2013 
 
  Δ O&G Tax Base ($10,000/student) 
Variables Propensity-Score-Trimmed Sample Distance-Trimmed Sample 
(Thick_Depth)  x Δ ln(Price), 2000-2012 -6.741*** -3.032** -5.765*** -1.880 
 
(1.536) (1.307) (1.740) (1.181) 
Wells drilled/sq. km, 2012, 2013 
 
-0.078 
 
-2.339 
  
(1.717) 
 
(4.966) 
Cumulative wells drilled/sq. km, 2011 
 
1.271** 
 
1.408*** 
    (0.539)   (0.511) 
F statistic on (Thick_Depth)  x Δ ln(Price) 19.3 5.4 11.0 2.5 
Zip Codes 69 69 59 59 
Observations 69 69 59 59 
Adjusted R squared 0.28 0.39 0.36 0.57 
Note: ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The results in Panel A exploit annual variation over the 2000 to 2013 period. For 
these results, robust standard errors clustered by zip code are in parenthesis. Year dummy variables are included in the annual-based regression but excluded 
from the table. The results in Panel B are based on differencing 2000 values from 2013 values, thereby converting the panel into a cross section of zip codes. For 
these results, unclustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The propensity-score-trimmed sample is based on trimming the full sample using optimal 
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cutoffs based on the estimated propensity to be a shale zip code based on socioeconomic characteristics as described in the text.  The distance-trimmed sample is 
based on removing the 25 percent of zip codes in the full sample that were furthest from the eastern boundary of the Barnett Shale.
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Table A2. Employment in shale and nonshale counties, 2001-2013 
      
 
Ln(Emp) 
  All Counties Excluding Tarrant and Dallas 
Shale 0.004 0.002 
 
(0.007) (0.008) 
Period 2009-2013 -0.019** -0.025*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Period x Shale 0.008 0.010 
 
(0.012) (0.013) 
Intercept 0.030*** 0.037*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
Observations 143 117 
Adjusted R-squared 0.042 0.066 
Note: ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. Shale counties are Denton, Hood, Johnson, Parker, and Tarrant. Nonshale counties are Dallas, Collin, 
Ellis, Hunt, Kaufman, and Rockwall. 
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Table A3. Construction trends in shale and nonshale counties  
      
  Ln(Permitted Buildings) Ln(Permitted Units) 
Shale -283 -729 
 
(880) (1,146) 
Period 2009-2013 -1,910*** -1,944* 
 
(664) (1,058) 
Period x Shale 134 14 
 
(1,006) (1,436) 
Intercept 3,468*** 4,715*** 
  (568) (787) 
Observations 154 154 
Adjusted R-squared 0.040 0.020 
Note: ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. Shale counties are Denton, Hood, Johnson, Parker, and Tarrant. Nonshale counties are Dallas, Collin, 
Ellis, Hunt, Kaufman, and Rockwall. 
 
 
 
 
